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Artificial Immune Systems have been successfully applied to a number 
of problem domains including fault tolerance and data mining, but have 
been shown to scale poorly when applied to  computer intrusion detec- 
tion despite the fact that the biological immune system is a very effective 
anomaly detector. This may be because AIS algorithms have previously 
been based on the adaptive immune system and biologically-naive mod- 
els. This  paper focuses on describing and testing a more complex and 
biologically-authentic AIS model, inspired by the interactions between the 
innate and adaptive immune systems. Its performance on a realistic process 
anomaly detection problem is shown to be better than standard AIS methods 
(negative-selection), policy-based anomaly detection methods (systrace), 
and an alternative innate AIS approach (the DCA). In addition, it is shown 
that runtime information can be used in combination with  system call 
information to enhance detection capability. 
 
Keywords: Second generation Artificial Immune Systems, innate immunity, process 
anomaly detection, intrusion detection systems 
 
 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is concerned with the classification performance of a novel Arti- 
ficial Immune System (AIS) on a process anomaly detection problem. The 
novel AIS (the tlr algorithm) incorporates mechanisms inspired by both the 
innate and adaptive biological immune systems, and produces a very low 
false positive rate when detecting attacks on an FTP server. As with many 
other process anomaly detection systems, system call information is used as 
one source of input data. However, another novel aspect of the tlr algorithm 
is the use of runtime statistics (such as process memory and file usage) as 
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context signals that form additional sources of input data. This aspect builds 
on the idea of gray-boxing, a term introduced several years ago [8] to denote 
intrusion detection systems that use runtime information as well as system call 
information. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some 
essential background information on intrusion and process anomaly detection, 
reviewing and describing the various approaches. It also introduces some 
fundamental AIS concepts including the notion of first and second generation 
AIS algorithms. A detailed explanation of the tlr algorithm’s architecture 
is given in Section 3, and Section 4 describes how a test dataset (wuftpd) 
is created and how the normal and anomalous test data is constructed, i.e., 
how the input system calls and context signals used by the tlr algorithm are 
gathered in practice. Section 5 reports on the experimental procedures adopted 
and the results are presented and discussed in Section 6; in particular, the tlr 
algorithm’s performance is compared with those of several other classifiers 
and anomaly detection approaches. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
2  BACKGROUND 
 
2.1  Process Anomaly Detection 
A process is a running instance of a program, and on modern multitasking 
operating systems many processes are effectively running simultaneously. For 
example, a server may be running a web server, email servers and a number 
of other services. A single program executable, when run, may create several 
child processes by forking or threading, and is then known as the parent 
process of those child processes; web servers typically start child processes to 
handle individual connections once they have been received. Child processes 
themselves may create children, sometimes generating a complex process 
tree derived from a single parent-process node, created when the executable 
is first run. The operating system is responsible for managing the execution 
of running processes, and associates a number with each one. This is called 
the process identifier (PID), as it uniquely identifies each process. When a 
process is started, the operating system associates other metadata with it too, 
such as the user who started it, and the PID of the parent process that created it. 
The operating system also allocates resources to running processes, including 
memory (which stores the executable code and data) and file descriptors, which 
identify files or network sockets that belong to the process. 
A number of host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been built 
around monitoring running processes to detect intrusions. In general, these 
IDSs collect information about a running process from a variety of sources, 
including from log files created by the process, or from other information 
gathered from the operating system. The general idea is that by observing 
what the process is currently doing, for example by looking at its log files, it is 
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possible to tell whether the process is behaving normally or has been subverted 
by an attack. Whilst log files are an obvious starting point for such systems, and 
are still an important component in a holistic security approach, it is fairly easy 
to execute attacks which do not cause any logging to take place, and so evade 
detection. Because of this, much research effort has been directed towards the 
use of other data sources, usually collected by the operating system. Of these, 
system calls (syscalls) have been the most favoured approach. 
A syscall is a low-level mechanism by which an application requests system 
services such as peripheral I/O or memory allocation from an operating sys- 
tem. As a process runs it cannot usually directly access memory or hardware 
devices; instead, the operating system manages these resources and provides 
a set of functions, called syscalls, which processes can call to access these 
services. On modern Linux systems there are around 300 syscalls, accessed 
via wrapper functions in the libc library. 
 
2.2  Process Anomaly Detection Systems 
Due to space constraints, this section focuses on syscall-based IDSs. The 
systrace system of Provos [18] is a syscall-based confinement and IDS for 
Linux, BSD and OSX systems. The IDS works by using a kernel patch that 
inserts various hooks into the kernel to intercept syscalls from the monitored 
process, and the user has to specify a syscall policy, i.e. a whitelist of permitted 
syscalls and arguments. The system can be run either automatically to deny 
and log all syscall attempts not permitted by the policy, or to prompt a user 
to permit or deny the syscall graphically. The latter mode can also be used 
to add syscalls to the policy, adjusting it before using it in automatic mode. 
Initial policies for a process are obtained by using templates or by running 
systrace in automatic policy-generation mode, where the monitored pro- 
cess is run under normal usage conditions, and permit entries are created in 
the policy file for all the syscalls made by the process. The policy specification 
also allows some matching of syscall arguments as well as syscall numbers. 
The system’s automatic policy-generation approach is used as a baseline com- 
parison for the tlr algorithm presented in this paper, which can be seen as a 
more sophisticated and dynamic alternative to systrace. 
In [8], Gao et al. introduce a new model of syscall behaviour called an exe- 
cution graph. An execution graph is a model that accepts approximately the 
same syscall sequences as a model built on a control flow graph. However, the 
execution graph is constructed from syscalls gathered during normal execu- 
tion, as opposed to a control flow graph, which is derived from static analysis. 
In addition to system call number, stack return addresses are also gathered 
and used in construction of the execution graph. The authors also introduce 
a course-grain classification of syscall-based IDSs into white-box, black-box 
and gray-box approaches. Black-box systems build their models from a sample 
of normal execution using only system call number and argument information. 
Gray-box approaches, as with black boxes, build their models from a sample of 
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normal execution but, as well as using syscall information, also use additional 
runtime information. White-box approaches do not use samples of normal 
execution, but instead use static analysis techniques to derive their models. 
The tlr algorithm, in Gao’s terms, is a gray-box approach, and is complemen- 
tary to the specific gray-box approach described by Gao, exploring different 
sources of runtime information other than stack return addresses. Specifically, 
tlr uses the memory and file-usage levels of the executing application. 
Forrest, Hofmeyr, Somayaji and other researchers at the University of New 
Mexico have developed several immune-inspired learning-based approaches. 
In [14], Forrest et al. evaluate a realtime system that detects anomalous pro- 
cesses by analysing sequences of system calls.  Syscalls generated by an 
application are grouped together into sequences, in this case sequences of 
six consecutive syscalls. A database of normal sequences is constructed and 
stored as a tree during training. Sequences of syscalls are then compared 
to this database using a Hamming distance metric, and a sufficient number 
of mismatches generates an alert. Somayaji [21] uses a similar approach to 
develop the immune-inspired pH intrusion prevention system, which detects 
and actively responds to changes in program behaviour in realtime. If an 
anomaly is detected, execution of the process that produced the syscalls is 
delayed for a period of time. The work presented in this paper differs from 
these approaches in that the tlr algorithm does not actively respond to misbe- 
having processes as in [21], it only generates alerts. Also, tlr bases its alerts 
on the simple syscall number combined with other runtime information (to 
improve detection capability), as opposed to the more complex representations 
of syscalls used by Forrest et al. 
 
2.3  Artificial Immune Systems 
The field of Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) began in the early 1990s with 
a number of independent groups conducting research that used the biological 
immune system as inspiration for solutions to problems in other domains. AISs 
have been built for a wide range of applications including document classifi- 
cation, fraud detection, and network- and host-based intrusion detection [6]. 
Specifically of relevance to the work here are AIS approaches to intrusion 
detection, which are reviewed by Aickelin et al. [5]. For example, a negative 
selection AIS algorithm is used in the process anomaly detection systems built 
by Forrest et al. [7]. AISs have met with some success and in some cases have 
rivalled or bettered existing statistical and machine learning techniques [13]. 
Immunology textbooks generally characterise the innate and adaptive 
immune systems as separate. The adaptive system is described as capable 
of specific recognition and remembrance of antigen, while the innate system 
is seen mainly as a first line of defence and rapid-response mechanism. Under- 
standably perhaps, from this perspective, a computer scientist might view the 
adaptive immune system as having more interesting properties such as learn- 
ing and memory. However, this view of the immune system as two discrete 
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systems does not reflect the intensive research and reassessment of the role of 
the innate immune system conducted over the last decade, as evidenced by the 
large number of papers published in immunology journals [9]. This research 
has uncovered many mechanisms by which the innate immune system inter- 
acts with the adaptive immune system, and has highlighted the role of the 
innate immune system as controller of the adaptive system. In other words, 
the protection afforded to the host by the immune system as a whole arises 
from mechanisms of the innate and adaptive immune systems, which form an 
integrated system. This new understanding of the structure and control of the 
immune system has led computer scientists to rethink the way in which they 
design their AISs; i.e. the importance of the innate immune system in AISs 
should mirror its worth in the biological organism. 
One of the aims of this work is to show the value of considering the 
biological immune system as composed of interacting innate and adaptive 
subsystems when attempting to design a realistic and profitable AIS model. 
Over the last few years a number of design principles have been developed 
for constructing what are termed second generation AISs [25]. These employ 
algorithms inspired by both the biological innate and adaptive immune sys- 
tems, as opposed to first generation AISs, which employ algorithms inspired 
only by the adaptive immune system. A software system called libtissue 
has also been developed. This allows researchers to implement second gen- 
eration AISs as multiagent systems and to analyse their behaviour when they 
are applied to real-world problems [23, 26]. With the work here and other 
work, the aim is to show how second generation AISs can overcome some of 
the problems that have been attributed to first generation AISs, for example 
accuracy and scalability [26]. 
 
 
 
3  THE tlr ALGORITHM 
 
The tlr algorithm is inspired by current immunological understanding of 
the interactions between two classes of immune cell: dendritic cells (DCs) 
and T cells (TCs). In particular, tlr uses a model of DC polarisation of 
T helper cells, based on the work of Kapsenberg [16]. Section 3.1 describes 
the biological theory that relates to these cells, their interactions and their 
environments, and Section 3.2 shows how these ideas have been abstracted to 
form the tlr algorithm - a working model of the innate and adaptive immune 
subsystems. Section 3.3 explains how the model has been used to create a 
host-based grey-box IDS. 
 
3.1  The Underlying Biology 
The adaptive immune system possesses two major types of lymphocytes that 
detect and respond to antigens, B cells (BCs) and T cells (TCs). TCs, the 
focus of this section, are responsible for the cell-mediated immune response 
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and possess receptors that can be thought of as complex sensors specific to 
features of antigens. For adaptive immune cells these receptors are somati- 
cally generated (created by a complex process of gene segment rearrangement 
within the cell) and are termed variable-region receptors, as each is specific for 
a particular protein sequence. Variable-region receptors are selected for over 
the lifetime of the organism by processes such as clonal expansion, deletion 
or anergy and are under adaptive not evolutionary pressure. TCs recognise 
a non-self target only after antigens have been processed and presented in 
combination with a self receptor called a major histocompatibility complex 
(MHC) molecule. 
TCs begin life in a naive state, in the lymph node, and there are two major 
subtypes; the killer TC and the helper TC. Killer TCs only recognize antigens 
coupled to Class I MHC (MHCI) molecules and are specialized in attacking 
cells of the body infected by viruses and sometimes by bacteria. They can also 
attack cancer cells. In contrast, helper TCs only recognize antigens coupled 
to Class II (MHC2) molecules and are responsible for regulation of both the 
innate and adaptive immune responses. They help determine which type of 
immune response the body will make to a particular antigen. Most antigens 
are T-dependent, meaning that two signals are necessary before the cell is 
attacked. The first signal comes from cross linking of the BC receptor and 
antigen and the second signal comes from co-stimulation provided by the 
helper TC. Co-stimualtion occurs when antigen presenting cells (APCs), for 
example DCs, present antigen on their MHC2 molecules. When these are 
recognized by helper TCs, the helper TC is activated and releases cytokines 
and other stimulatory signals that cause the activity of macrophages, killer 
TCs and BCs. 
In contrast to the adaptive case,  the receptors of innate system cells 
are entirely germline-encoded, in other words their structure is determined 
by the genome of the cell and has a fixed, genetically-determined speci- 
ficity. Unlike adaptive system cells, they recognise a set of ligands under 
evolutionary pressure. One key group of innate receptors is the pattern recog- 
nition receptor (PRR) superfamily which recognises evolutionary-conserved 
pathogen-associated molecular patterns (PAMPs). PRRs do not recognise 
a specific feature of a specific pathogen as variable-region receptors do, but 
instead recognise common features or products of an entire class of pathogens. 
Thus, innate immune system receptors are termed non-specific, while adap- 
tive immune system receptors are termed specific. The toll-like receptor (TLR) 
family of PRRs is the best characterised. 
Recently a lot of research effort has been directed towards understanding 
how the innate immune system mediates the quality of an adaptive immune 
system response [9, 15]. Simplistically, this is concerned with understanding 
how the DCs interact with the TCs to prevent them from becoming active in 
the presence of self-antigen. DCs are generated in the bone marrow and ini- 
tially reside as immature cells in the epithelia of the skin and mucosal tissue. 
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Their main functions are phagocytosis (the capture of complex molecules 
and entire cells from their surrounding environment) and antigen presenta- 
tion. They collect the antigen through antigen receptors (AgRs) and express a 
special set of TLRs, which respond to PAMPs and are also activated by host- 
derived endogenous molecules (danger signals) that are produced when tissue 
is damaged. Periodically, DCs migrate to the draining lymphoid tissues where 
they halt phagocytosis, display the peptides they have collected, and interact 
with naive TCs. When their TLRs have become activated and antigen have 
been detected they differentiate into mature DCs and immediately migrate. 
They also migrate when they have reached their maximum lifespan and have 
detected antigen, in which case they differentiate into semimature DCs. Both 
semimature and mature DCs express antigen producers (AgPs), which give 
other cells access to the antigen they have collected. Mature DCs alone produce 
IL-12, which is used by naive TCs to differentiate between mature and semi- 
mature DCs. Essentially, the presence of biological danger signals causes a DC 
to present its antigen in a mature, immunogenic context, causing TC activa- 
tion, whereas their absence causes the antigen to be presented in a semimature, 
tolerogenic context, and the TC is deleted. 
In this way, DCs match the quality of the adaptive immune effector response 
to the nature of the antigen. They are therefore vital in the control of the adap- 
tive immune system and the generation of tolerance to antigen in peripheral 
tissue. Through the production of a range of cytokines, DCs control the acti- 
vation and proliferation of TCs and BCs, and determine the qualitative and 
quantitative nature of the adaptive immune response. 
 
3.2  The tlr Model 
As in Kapsenberg’s model [16], DCs can either be immature, semimature or 
mature, and TCs either naive or activated. Furthermore, in the tlr model, 
cells exist within either the extralymphoid tissue compartment or lymph node 
compartment, and cell types are restricted to particular compartments. This is 
shown schematically in Figure 1. Immature DCs and activated TCs are only 
found in the extralymphoid compartment, and semimature DCs, mature DCs 
and naive TCs in the lymph node compartment. 
Just as in the biological system, the model cells are not immortal but live for 
a certain period of time, which leads to a fluctuation in population levels for 
certain cell types. The number of immature DCs and naive TCs are purpose- 
fully maintained at constant levels, i.e. whenever an immature DC matures, it 
is immediately replaced by another immature DC, and whenever a naive TC 
dies it is immediately replaced by another naive TC. However, the population 
levels of semimature DCs, mature DCs and activated TCs are not fixed and are 
homeostatically determined by the cells of tlr itself and their environment. 
In order to detect anomalies the level of activated TCs is monitored, and if 
any activated TCs are produced an alert is generated. Homeostatic determi- 
nation of cell numbers is found to be particularly useful since, during periods 
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FIGURE 1 
A schematic representation of the tlr algorithm. For DCs i = immature, sm = semimature and 
m = mature. For TCs a = activated, n = naive. 
 
 
 
of normal usage, cell numbers are generally kept at low levels, which reduces 
the computational cost of the algorithm. 
DCs begin life in the extralymphoid compartment, in an immature state, 
where they collect antigen (syscalls) through their AgRs and observe the levels 
of context signals (other system information) through their TLRs. If their 
TLRs become activated by an appropriate context signal and at least one 
antigen has been collected, immature DCs differentiate into mature DCs and 
traffic to the lymph node compartment. However, if an immature DC reaches 
its maximum lifespan without its TLRs being activated but has collected at 
least one antigen, it differentiates into a semimature DC and traffics to the 
lymph node compartment. Immature DCs which reach the end of their lifespan 
without collecting antigen remain in the extralymphoid tissue. Here, activating 
levels of context signals are analagous to biological danger signals, which 
cause a DC to present its antigen in the mature, immunogenic context. 
TCs begin life as naive TCs in the lymph node compartment and bind with 
a number of semimature or mature DCs per cycle, provided there is at least one 
semimature or mature DC in this compartment. The DC is chosen randomly 
and uniformly from the complete population of semimature and mature DCs, 
so if the number of mature DCs is greater than the number of semimature DCs, 
a naive TC will have a greater probability of binding with a mature DC than 
a semimature DC and vice versa. If a naive TC successfully binds with a DC 
then it will examine the antigen the DC has collected as an immature DC in the 
extralymphoid compartment (and is displaying on its AgPs). If a match occurs 
and the bound DC is a semimature DC then the naive TC will be deleted and the 
semimature DC will receive a stay-alive signal. This stay-alive signal resets 
the number of iterations the semimature DC has existed for to zero. If a match 
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occurs and the bound DC is a mature DC then the naive TC will be activated 
and will clone a single activated TC. The activated TC will then traffic back 
to the extralymphoid compartment and the naive TC will remain in the lymph 
node compartment. In this case, both the naive TC and mature DC receive 
stay-alive signals, resetting the number of iterations these cells have existed 
for to zero, based on biological mechanisms of reverse signalling. Detailed 
pseudocode for the tlr algorithm is provided in Section 3.4. 
 
3.3  The Use of tlr as an IDS 
The TLRs on DCs are activated by certain context signal values analagous 
to biological danger signals. Here, system information (other than syscall 
number) is used, (discussed shortly in Section 4). In contrast, AgRs on naive 
TCs are activated by certain antigen values, which are the syscall numbers. 
In order to determine which signal and antigen values activate these receptors 
tlr needs to be provided with a set of training data consisting of a sample 
of normal instances only. Once this is provided, all of the normal antigen and 
danger signal values are extracted and stored, and then a new set of permissible 
AgR values is created by removing all the antigen observed in the training set 
from the set of all possible antigen values (around 350 in the case of syscall 
numbers). In a similar way, TLRs are only activated by signal levels not seen 
in the training set. However, since context signals are represented as real 
numbers, the set of all possible values for a particular context signal need not 
be finite. Additionally, TLRs, unlike AgRs, are not specific for one particular 
value, but rather any value not seen in the training set. The signals used here 
(see Section 4) are all integers from finite sets, so this scheme works well. 
However, the levels of other real-valued signals would need to be discretised 
for this scheme to work effectively with them. 
After training has taken place and the algorithm is tested, AgRs are gener- 
ated by choosing a value at random from the permissible set of antigen, and 
assigning it as the receptor’s lock. Exact matching is used, so that the AgR is 
only activated if its lock matches that of an antigen presented on an AgP of 
a DC. This is equivalent to the naive TC undergoing negative selection on the 
antigen in the training set, and produces naive TCs with AgRs that will never 
match an antigen seen in the training set. 
Syscalls are collected and grouped temporally, i.e.  those which occur 
around the same time period are collected and stored, and the external signals 
sensed by immature DCs also group the syscalls contextually; semimature 
DCs associate a normal context to the syscalls they have collected, while 
mature DCs associate an attack context with these syscalls. The addition 
of contextual grouping as well as temporal grouping has two effects on the 
repertoire of AgRs. First, non-deterministic interactions between semima- 
ture DCs and naive TCs allows tlr to continue to censor its AgR repertoire 
after the training phase, i.e. AgRs that are specific for syscalls produced dur- 
ing normal sessions (but not present during training) are quickly removed. 
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This peripheral tolerance mechanism helps reduce the number of false posi- 
tives. Second, non-deterministic interactions between mature DCs and naive 
TCs promote the survival of naive TCs that successfully match antigen pre- 
sented by mature DCs. These naive TCs are given a stay-alive signal by the 
mature DCs and remain within the population of naive TCs for longer. Since 
the population size of naive TCs is constant, the rate of entry of new naive 
TCs into the current naive TC population is reduced. Therefore, the contextual 
information provided by mature DCs serves to help maintain a population of 
successful naive TCs, and reduce the number of incoming naive TCs. The tlr 
algorithm is formalized in the pseudocode given below, and the libtissue 
parameters used are given in Table 4 in Appendix A. A full justification of the 
selection of parameters is provided in [24], Chapter 8. 
 
3.4  tlr Pseudocode 
Pseudocode for the tlr algorithm, see Table 4 in Appendix A for parameter 
values. 
 
SUBROUTINE  imma ture  d c   c e l l    c y c l e    c a l l b a c k  
IF   c e l l   i t e r a t i o n s   >=   c e l l _ l i f e s p a n _ 1  THEN 
IF   c e l l    h a s   c o l l e c t e d   a n y   a n t i g e n   THEN 
SET   c e l l   t yp e   t o   s emima t ure  d c 
SET   c e l l   c y c l e   t o   s emima t ure  d c   c e l l   c y c l e 
SET   c e l l   i t e r a t i o n s   t o   0 
SET   number   o f    a n t i g e n    p r o d u c e r s    t o   n u m _ a n t i g e n _ p r o d u c e r s _ 1  
SET  number   o f   a n t i g e n   r e c e p t o r s   t o   0 
SET  number   o f   c y t o k i n e   r e c e p t o r s   t o   0 
a d d   a   new   imma t u r e   d c   t o    t i s s u e    compa r tm en t  
RETURN 
ELSE 
r e p l a c e   c e l l   w i t h   a  new  imma ture  d c 
RETURN 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
FOR   a l l    c y t o k i n e    r e c e p t o r s   DO  #   n u m _ c y t o k i n e _ r e c e p t o r s _ 1  
IF   c y t o k i n e   r e c e p t o r   a c t i v a t e d  THEN 
IF   c e l l   h a s   c o l l e c t e d   a n y   a n t i g e n  
THEN SET   c e l l    t y p e   t o   ma ture   d c 
SET   c e l l   c y c l e   t o   ma t ure   d c   c e l l   c y c l e 
SET   c e l l   i t e r a t i o n s   t o   0 
SET  number   o f   a n t i g e n   p r o d u c e r s   t o   n um _ a n t i g e n _ p r o d u c e r s _ 1  
SET  number   o f   a n t i g e n   r e c e p t o r s   t o   0 
SET  number   o f   c y t o k i n e   r e c e p t o r s   t o   0 
a d d   a   new   imma t u r e   d c   t o    t i s s u e    compa r tm en t  
RETURN 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
ENDFOR 
ENDSUBROUTINE 
 
SUBROUTINE   n a i v e    t c    c e l l    c y c l e    c a l l b a c k  
IF   c e l l   i t e r a t i o n s   >=   c e l l _ l i f e s p a n _ 2  THEN 
r e p l a c e   c e l l   w i t h   a  new   na i ve   t c 
RETURN 
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ENDIF 
FOR   a l l    v r    r e c e p t o r s   DO  #   n u m _ v r _ r e c e p t o r s _ 2  
IF   v r   r e c e p t o r   a c t i v a t e d  THEN 
IF   v r   r e c e p t o r   a c t i v a t e d   b y   a n t i g e n   o n   s emima t u re  d c  
THEN SET  s emima t u re  d c    i t e r a t i o n s   t o   1 
r e p l a c e   c e l l   w i t h   a  new   na i ve   t c 
RETURN 
ENDIF 
IF   v r   r e c e p t o r   a c t i v a t e d   b y   a n t i g e n   o n   ma ture   d c  THEN 
SET  mature   d c    i t e r a t i o n s   t o   1 
SET   c e l l   t yp e   t o   a c t i v a t e d   t c 
SET   c e l l   c y c l e   t o   a c t i v a t e d   t c   c e l l   c y c l e 
SET   c e l l   i t e r a t i o n s   t o   0 
SET  number   o f   c e l l   r e c e p t o r s   t o   0 
SET  number   o f   v r   r e c e p t o r s   t o   0 
a d d   a   new   n a i v e    t c    t o    t i s s u e    c ompa r tm en t  
WRITE   matched   a n t i g e n    t o   l o g    f i l e  
RETURN 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
ENDFOR 
ENDSUBROUTINE 
 
SUBROUTINE   s em im a t u r e   d c   c e l l    c y c l e    c a l l b a c k  
IF   c e l l   i t e r a t i o n s   >=   c e l l _ l i f e s p a n _ 3  THEN 
remove   s em im a t u r e   d c   f rom    t i s s u e    compar tm en t  
ENDIF 
ENDSUBROUTINE 
 
SUBROUTINE   ma tu r e   d c   c e l l    c y c l e    c a l l b a c k  
IF   c e l l   i t e r a t i o n s   >=   c e l l _ l i f e s p a n _ 4  THEN 
remove   m a t u r e   d c   f rom    t i s s u e    c ompa r tm en t  
ENDIF 
ENDSUBROUTINE 
 
SUBROUTINE   a c t i v a t e d    t c    c e l l    c y c l e    c a l l b a c k  
IF   c e l l   i t e r a t i o n s   >=   c e l l _ l i f e s p a n _ 5  THEN 
remove   a c t i v a t e d    t c   f rom    t i s s u e    compa r tm en t  
ENDIF 
FOR  each   a n t i g e n   i n   t i s s u e    compar tment  
DO IF   v r    r e c e p t o r    ma tche s   a n t i g e n   
THEN 
SET   c e l l   i t e r a t i o n s    t o   0 
BREAKFOR 
ENDIF 
ENDFOR 
ENDSUBROUTINE 
 
 
Greensmith [10–12] has also used libtissue to implement an immune- 
inspired process anomaly detection system. This algorithm, called the DCA, 
is inspired by biological DCs and is similar to the tlr algorithm in its use of 
libtissue and models of biological DC activation and maturation. However, 
there are several important differences between tlr and the DCA. Although 
both systems incorporate the use of signals to govern DC behaviour, they do 
so in different ways. For example, the DCA might identify CPU usage as 
belonging to the class of safe signals and memory usage to the class of danger 
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signals. Due to the way DCs integrate and process input signals, the class an 
input signal belongs to has a differential effect on DC maturation. If the classes 
of CPU and memory usage signals are interchanged, the algorithm behaves 
differently. In contrast, the tlr algorithm does not differentiate between dif- 
ferent classes; all input signals have the same effect on DC maturation, i.e. 
they cause immature DCs to become mature DCs if the signal level is not 
observed during training. In this sense, the DCA uses a finer-grain model of 
input signals than tlr. 
Another important difference relates to the way in which anomalies are 
detected by the two systems. The DCA observes DCs to determine if a process 
is behaving anomalously, whereas tlr uses DCs to control TCs and observes 
TCs to determine anomalous process behaviour. While the DCA concentrates 
on developing a system based entirely on DCs, tlr focuses on combining 
a DC-based algorithm with current adaptive AIS algorithms. This is a result 
of different motivations for developing the DCA and the tlr algorithm. The 
DCA was developed to explore better methods of modelling DCs in AISs, 
whereas tlr was developed to explore the construction of second generation 
AISs that incorporate both innate and adaptive immune system mechanisms. 
Lastly, an essential part of tlr is the training phase in which normal usage is 
used to establish activating levels of external signals, as well as permissible 
values for AgRs. The DCA does not use a training phase, but instead uses 
heuristics derived from observations of the biological immune system and the 
computer system being protected to determine activating levels of signals. The 
DCA has been tested on the same dataset used here and its results [10] are 
presented for comparison with the tlr algorithm in Section 6. 
 
 
4  DATASETS 
 
4.1  Network Architecture 
In order to derive a suitable test dataset, a small experimental network with 
two hosts is set up. One host, the target, runs software, in this case a Redhat 6.2 
server with a number of vulnerabilities, and wuftpd is started at boot time. 
The other host acts as a client which interacts with the target machine, either 
attempting to exploit its vulnerabilities or simulating normal usage. In order 
to gather the actual data, i.e. process syscall information and context signals, 
the target system is instrumented: the FTP server executable is wrapped with 
strace [18], which logs all the syscalls made by wuftpd and its children. 
At the same time, a process_monitor is started, which monitors a process 
and all of its child processes at regular intervals. In order to see a useful 
resolution in the signals, a monitoring interval of one tenth of a second is 
used. This method is found to be the most portable and still quite efficient, 
only using around 1–2% of the system CPU resources on average, which is 
considered reasonable. The range of context signals which are thought to be 
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Statistic Summary 
 
processes number of monitored process including children. 
cpu (%) cpu utilisation of the process. The CPU time divided by 
the time the process has been running (cputime/realtime 
ratio). 
mem (%) ratio of the processes’ resident set size to the physical 
memory on the machine. 
rss (kB) resident set size, the non-swapped physical memory that a 
task has used. 
size (kB) approximate quantity of swap space that would be required 
if the process were to dirty all writeable pages and then 
be swapped out. 
sz size in physical pages of the core image of the process. This 
includes text, data, and stack space. 
vsz (KB) virtual memory size of the process. 
num_files total number of files reported by lsof. 
num_reg number of regular files. 
num_dir number of directories. 
num_chr number of character devices. 
num_ipv4 number of IPv4 sockets. 
num_sock number of sockets of unknown domain. 
num_unix number of unix domain sockets. 
num_unknown   number of unclassified sockets (not reg, dir, . . .) 
 
TABLE 1 
Statistics collected by process_monitor. Fourteen context signals are collected 
in total 
 
 
potentially interesting are logged for later analysis and are summarised in 
Table 1. As well as being feasible to gather, these context signals all relate to 
a process’s interaction with the operating system, and other local or remote 
processes. Further technical details about the platform set-up are provided in 
Appendix B. 
 
4.2  Normal Usage 
The levels of the collected signals need to be examined over a range of different 
server activities in order to establish which ones are useful for detecting process 
anomalies. Data is therefore collected over several normal usage scenarios, 
with the aim of getting the testbed FTP server to behave as if a real FTP server is 
running on a production network. Ideally, if strace and process_monitor 
were installed on a production FTP server then the logs collected by them 
would be identical to those collected on the testbed FTP server. Realistically, 
there is a trade-off between the fidelity of the testbed logs and time spent in 
building and operating the testbed. The methodology employed here allows 
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for largely automated reproduction of normal usage from previously gath- 
ered logs of real FTP servers, i.e. public-domain datasets of FTP client-server 
interactions are used to provide samples of normal usage. The dataset used 
is a subset of LBNL-FTP-PKT [3], which contains all incoming anonymous 
FTP connections to public FTP servers at the Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory over a ten-day period. The dataset is available from the Internet 
Traffic Archive [3], and its traces, which provide a rich source of normal 
usage sessions, contain connections between 320 distinct FTP servers and 
5832 distinct clients. The traces for one FTP server (IP 131.243.2.12) on the 
10/01/03 and 11/01/03 are used in the experiments presented here, provid- 
ing a total of 340 traces for 76 distinct clients. This particular FTP server is 
selected as it was running wuftpd 2.6.2-1, a similar version to the testbed 
server used here,  and also because it has the second highest number of 
connections. 
In all cases, FTP server activity is produced by the interaction of FTP clients, 
i.e. an FTP client connects to a server and initiates an FTP session in which it 
issues FTP requests according to the FTP protocol (defined in RFC959) before 
disconnecting from the server. Out of the 340 traces used, eight are empty, 
containing no FTP requests, and many of the other 332 are characterised by 
USER and PASS commands, followed by an optional STAT, then a series of 
PORT commands, often lasting tens of minutes, finishing with an optional 
QUIT. One session of each of these is included in the normal usage dataset 
and the others (278) are discarded so as not to bias the data. 
For the testing of process anomaly detection systems, which is concerned 
primarily with the type of behaviour and not its frequency, only one example of 
a typical normal session is necessary. Duplicate sessions are therefore removed 
from the data, i.e. the original FTP sessions are examined, largely by hand, and 
sessions which contain the same commands with very similar relative timings 
(no more than around a second) are removed. These sessions are usually seen 
coming from the same hosts and appear to be generated by an automated FTP 
client repeating the same sessions. Indeed, analysis of the two days’ worth of 
traces shows that many sessions are frequently repeated. Discarding duplicates 
over the two days leaves 55 different normal usage sessions. Although some 
information in the traces has been anonymised using Bro [17] to remove 
private information, it is still possible to reproduce realistic normal usage. 
 
4.3  Attack Traces 
The publically available autowux exploit [2] is used to attack wuftpd. This 
exploit levers a format string vulnerability, in this case related to the SITE 
EXEC FTP command, in order to obtain a remote root shell on the server 
by default. It has been seen in the wild in manual attacks and automated 
attacks such as the Ramen worm [19]. An FTP bounce scan attack [1] is also 
performed; here, an attacker uses an FTP server as an intermediary to perform 
a network scan and hide the IP address of their machine. 
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TABLE 2 
Session Name Nature of Attack 
 
success01 autowux attack 
# ./autowux -t target -v 2 
success02 autowux attack 
# ./autowux -t target -v 2 
# uname -a 
# whoami 
# ls 
# exit 
success03 autowux attack 
# ./autowux -t target -v 2 
# cd / 
# mkdir .boot 
# cd .boot 
# ftp host1 
anonymous 
(no password) 
get autowux.tar.gz 
quit 
# tar -xzvf autowux.tar.gz 
# exit 
success04 nmap bounce scan 
# nmap -v -P0 -b target host 
failure01 autowux attack 
# ./autowux -t target -v 2 -s 1 
The five attack sessions collected for wuftpd running on an instrumented Redhat 6.2 
server. The first three attacks are variations on the autowux attack. The fourth attack 
is an FTP bounce scan and the final attack is a failed autowux attack 
 
 
The syscalls and signal levels for several different autowux attacks and one 
nmap FTP bounce attack are recorded. In each case, the commands given on the 
attacking client machine are summarised in Table 2. The DNS hostname of the 
FTP server is “target” and “host” denotes the attacking machine. Commands 
following the first autowux command are those given in the remote shell once 
it has been opened several minutes after the launch of the attack. The session 
success01 consists of the autowux attack without any commands executed 
in the remote shell, mainly for comparison with the other attacks (although 
this is fairly unrealistic). Session success02 and session success03 simulate 
potential actions an attacker might perform in the shell once it has been opened 
and are of more interest. Session success02 represents a minimal information 
gathering excerise, while in session success03 the attacker connects back to 
the attacking machine via FTP and downloads and untars a file, in this case 
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the autowux attack itself. Session success04 is an nmap FTP bounce attack 
that was successful for unprivileged ports. An unsuccessful autowux attack 
session, failure01, is also performed by specifying the insertion of OpenBSD 
shellcode on the autowux command line. This is seen as  important since 
process anomaly detection systems should not alert against failed attacks oth- 
erwise they become vulnerable to diversionary noise attacks such as snot [20], 
which can be used to hide successful attacks. In total these attacks generated 
around 40,000 syscalls, and 10,000 readings for each signal. 
The combined normal and attack traces form a single dataset (called 
the wuftpd dataset) that can be used to evaluate the classification perfor- 
mance of the anomaly detection systems described here. In order to facilitate 
comparisons with other systems it is publically available [4]. 
 
4.4  Signal Analysis 
The strategy adopted during signal collection as described above is to collect, 
from the authors’ experience, what might be interesting signals. For the pur- 
poses of the research presented here interesting signals are those that vary in a 
complex way across normal usage and attack sessions. Clearly, if a particular 
signal always has certain values for attack sessions and different values for 
normal sessions, then it would make sense to use this signal as an indicator of 
misuse and dispense with anomaly detection algorithms. However, no such 
signals are expected nor have been found. In order to determine which of the 
collected signals are potentially interesting an analysis of the gathered data is 
performed. 
When examining the signal levels for all 55 normal usage sessions more 
closely it becomes clear that the memory related signals are closely correlated, 
as are a number of the file signals. Closer examination of these two groups 
leads to the elimination of several of the correlated signals. For example, 
the size and sz signals always report the same values. Also, several of 
the signals have the same small number of levels in general regardless of 
whether the session is an attack or normal usage, and so these signals are 
also eliminated. The range of values a signal takes over all the normal and 
attack sessions can be seen from the scatter plots shown in Figure 2. The upper 
graph shows the observed signal levels for the number of process children, 
which is considered uninteresting due to its lack of variation over normal 
and attack sessions. The lower graph in Figure 2 shows the observed levels 
for the rss memory signal, which is considered interesting since there is 
considerable variation in signal levels between normal and attack sessions, 
although there is no clear division of levels and crossover exists between 
signal levels. A similar plot for all the remaining signals shows that there is 
also considerable variation in the num_files and num_reg signals. These 
two signals together with rss are used as the context (danger) signals in the 
experiments that follow. 
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FIGURE 2 
500  
0 50 100 150 200 250 
seconds 
Scatter plots of signal levels for all sessions. The top graph shows the levels observed for the 
number of process children signal. Generally, attack and normal (benign) sessions share similar 
values for this signal, so it is discarded as uninteresting. The bottom graph shows the levels for 
the rss memory signal. There is much more variation in this case, with different signal levels 
being observed for attack and normal sessions, although some values are shared by both classes 
of session. This signal is considered more useful. 
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5  EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
 
An important aspect of second generation AISs is their use of multiple sources 
of input data. This idea has also been advocated by Gao et al. [8] through the 
notion of gray-boxing. In order to explore these ideas further, three different 
versions of the tlr algorithm are evaluated, named tlr1, tlr2 and tlr3. For 
all three of these algorithms, the syscall number alone is used as antigen. For 
tlr1, the rss context signal is used as the danger signal, and immature DCs 
have a TLR that monitors this signal and is activated by values not seen during 
training. For tlr2, immature DCs have two TLRs, one that responds to the 
rss context signal, and another that is activated by values of the num_files 
context signal not seen during training. If either of these receptors is activated, 
then the immature DC will develop into a mature DC. For tlr3, immature 
DCs have three TLRs, one for the rss context signal, one for the num_files 
context signal, and one for the num_reg context signal. In this case, if any of 
these receptors is activated, the immature DC will change into a mature DC. 
Hence, the effects of the addition of input data sources can be assessed by 
comparing the performances of tlr1, tlr2 and tlr3. 
The use of process_monitor and strace imposes minimal CPU and 
memory overheads on the system when gathering data. Timings of syscalls 
during a single session are preserved and readings of resource usage statistics 
are taken at regular intervals. One limitation of the dataset is that, when stored 
as tcreplay log files, the overall timings of these sessions relative to each 
other are not stored. Consequently, when testing AISs with this dataset, an 
assumption has to be made concerning the relative timings of each session. In 
the experiments that follow, sessions are assumed to occur sequentially, with 
a short, uniformly-distributed period of no activity between sessions. 
The dynamics of the tlr algorithm for a particular FTP session are in 
part determined by previous FTP sessions. For example, syscalls which are 
not available during training but which are presented in a normal context 
during operation, as discussed above, lead to a reduction in the number of TCs 
specific for such syscalls through peripheral tolerance. Hence, using tlr to 
classify FTP sessions in isolation could produce unrealistic results. A number 
of scenarios are therefore created, consisting of a number of FTP sessions 
occurring sequentially with a random pause of 1 to 10 seconds between them. 
This is a simplification of the session timings observed for the actual FTP 
sessions in the LBNL-FTP-PKT traces, but is necessary in order to reduce the 
durations of the experiments. (In the LBNL-FTP-PKT traces there are often 
several minutes between one session and the next, and at other times two 
sessions overlap.) Here, each scenario takes approximately 50 minutes to run. 
Forty scenarios are generated in total, with 20 containing only normal FTP 
sessions and the remaining 20 containing normal and attack FTP sessions. 
The latter group should hence be classified as attack sessions. In order to 
create a scenario the 55 normal sessions are partitoned into two sets of 27 and 
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28 sessions. One set is used to train tlr, and the other set is used to create the 
scenario on which tlr is tested. The two sets are then swapped around, so that 
the sessions in the testing scenario are used to train tlr, and vice versa for the 
training sessions. In other words, two-fold crossvalidation is performed. The 
sets are randomly partitioned in this way eight times so that sixteen normal 
scenarios are generated. The attack sessions are produced in exactly the same 
way except that an attack session is inserted at a random point in the sequence 
of normal sessions. The success.001 and success.002 sessions are used six 
times each, and the success.003 and success.004 session four times each, 
making a total of 20 attack scenarios. Four additional normal scenarios are 
also created as just described by inserting the failed attack session at a random 
point in a sequence of normal sessions. Together with the 16 normal scenarios 
already generated, this makes a total of 20 normal scenarios. 
In order to provide a comparison with the results for the tlr algorithm, 
several other classifiers are also tested with each of the 40 scenarios. First, as 
a baseline comparison, a classifier that uses a whitelist of acceptable syscalls 
is used. A syscall policy is generated for a process by recording the syscalls 
it makes under normal usage, with a permit policy statement entered for all 
these syscalls. During testing, syscalls are compared to this whitelist and 
any process that generates unlisted syscalls is classified as under attack. The 
method is quite realistic considering how current systems such as systrace 
automatically generate a policy. 
The whitelist approach is also taken using the signal values rss, 
num_files and num_reg instead of the syscalls. This generates three simple 
classifiers, called sig1, sig2 and sig3, which extract all the signal levels 
seen during training. These systems classify a scenario as an attack if any 
signal levels absent from the whitelist are seen during testing. System sig1 
classifies a scenario as an attack based only on the rss signal, system sig2 
uses this and the num_files signal, and system sig3 uses all three signals. 
The tlr algorithm is also compared to a standard negative selection AIS 
approach, since for a finite set, a systrace whitelist approach and nega- 
tive selection blacklist approach are logically equivalent and are therefore 
expected to perform similarly. In order to implement a negative selection algo- 
rithm, a slightly altered version of tlr (called tlr-negsel) is created with 
the TLRs on immature DCs disabled. In tlr-negsel immature DCs are no 
longer able to respond to signals and hence always differentiate into semima- 
ture DCs and never become mature DCs. Consequently, naive TCs are never 
activated and no alerts are ever produced, since these are generated whenever 
activated TCs are observed. Therefore, in tlr-negsel semimature DCs are 
forced to express IL-12, effectively turning them into mature DCs, which per- 
mits their activation. The absence of semimature DCs in tlr-negsel means 
that no peripheral tolerance of naive TCs by semimature DCs occurs. The only 
criteria for activation of native TCs is a match between their AgRs and the 
syscalls being presented by DCs. By disabling peripheral tolerance, negative 
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selection alone (which is used to generate the AgRs) controls the classification 
performance of tlr-negsel. 
Finally, the performance of the DCA with the wuftpd dataset has also 
been published in [10], and the results obtained are used here as an additional 
comparison to the tlr algorithm. This is both fair and convenient since both 
the DCA and the tlr algorithm use the libtissue framework and make 
use of the same information in order to process the data. As with the tlr 
algorithm, the DCA uses system call ID numbers to represent antigen and 
the context signals rss, num_files and num_reg to represent the danger 
signals. 
 
 
 
6  RESULTS 
 
The true and false positive rates for each of the classifiers are given in Table 3 
below. The true positive rate TPR is calculated from: 
 
TP 
TPR = 
TP 
, (1) 
+ FN 
where TP is the number of true positives and FN is the number of false 
negatives. Likewise, the false positive rate FPR is calculated from: 
 
FP 
FPR = 
FP 
, (2) 
+ TN 
where FP is the number of false positives and TN is the number of true 
negatives. The table also shows the g-mean G given by: 
 
G = 
   
TPR(1 — FPR),  (3) 
 
 
System TPR FPR G 
systrace 0.90 0.60 0.60 
tlr-negsel 0.90 0.60 0.60 
sig1 1.00 1.00 0.00 
sig2 1.00 1.00 0.00 
sig3 1.00 1.00 0.00 
tlr1 0.70 0.20 0.75 
tlr2 0.60 0.20 0.69 
tlr3 0.75 0.15 0.80 
DCA 1.00 0.83 0.41 
TABLE 3 
Classification performance results for the systems implemented. For equal true and 
false positive costs, tlr3 is the best performing classifier 
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which provides an overall evaluation of the TPR and FPR, producing a high 
value for better classifiers. Note that an equal cost for true and false positives 
is assumed here. However, in situations where one of these costs is more 
important than the other, further analysis would be necessary to characterise 
the relative performance of the classifiers. 
Table 3 shows that the sig1, sig2 and sig3 classifiers perform badly, 
classifying every scenario as an attack. Consequently, the systems are of no 
use and this is reflected in the g-mean value of 0.00. The systrace and 
negative selection classifiers perform equally, with a high TPR of 0.90, but 
also a high FPR of 0.60, meaning that while these classifiers identify 90% 
of attack scenarios correctly, they also identify 60% of normal scenarios as 
attacks. The g-mean for both of these systems is 0.60. In general, the tlr 
classifiers reduce the FPR with an accompanying small reduction in the TPR. 
Compared with the systrace and negative selection classifiers, the tlr1 
classifier reduces the FPR by 40% to 0.20 with a 20% decrease in the TPR 
to 0.70. The resulting g-mean value is 0.75. The tlr2 classifier has a slightly 
larger reduction in the TPR (30%) to 0.6 but has the same FPR as tlr1, which 
gives a g-mean value of 0.69. The tlr3 classifier performs best reducing the 
FPR by 45% to 0.15, while only reducing TPR by 15% to 0.75. Its resulting 
g-mean value is 0.80, the highest of all the systems tested. The DCA has 
a perfect TPR of 1.00 i.e. all attack scenarios are correctly classified, but 
the FPR is unacceptably high (0.83), which produces a low g-mean value 
of 0.41. 
The  tlr algorithm,  which  is  unoptimised,  uses  around 10%  of  the 
CPU resources and never more than 8% of the memory resources on the 
test machine. Generally, CPU usage is only a few percent as cell levels 
are maintained at a low level during normal usage. 
 
6.1  Discussion 
The results have provided evidence that the additional context signals rss, 
num_files and num_reg have the capacity to reduce the false positive rate 
when used as danger signals in the immune-inspired tlr algorithm. In addi- 
tion, the system performs best when all three of these signals are used in 
conjunction with the syscall information. However, when the the syscall infor- 
mation is removed (in the case of sig1, sig2, and sig3) and the system is run 
as a white-list classifier, the IDS is unable to function. This strongly suggests 
that both types of information source have an important role to play in process 
anomaly detection. 
The results using the negative selection version of the tlr algorithm are 
also poor with regard to the false positve rate. Indeed, Stibor [22] shows 
that certain matching approaches such as Hamming distance work poorly 
with negative approaches, introducing an infeasible amount of complexity. 
Reduction of this complexity by generalisation of the matching criteria results 
in a significant decrease in the classification performance. Based on these 
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observations, Stibor concludes that negative approaches such as immune- 
inspired negative selection are unsuitable for real-world anomaly detection 
problems. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that detection systems 
based only on negative selection are unsuitable in this context. Used in com- 
bination with innate-inspired mechanisms results could be much improved, as 
demonstrated here. 
The systrace and negative selection based tlr-negsel classifiers give 
the same classification results in terms of true and false positives. Examination 
of the results for each scenario shows that both systems also classify exactly 
the same scenarios as normal and anomalous. This is expected and is a good 
test for determining the completeness of coverage for the negative selection 
algorithm. As mentioned previously, the systrace whitelist approach and 
negative selection blacklist approach are in principle equivalent for a finite set 
of antigen. This is because a blacklist is the complement set of a whitelist, so 
determining whether an antigen is on the whitelist or not on the blacklist are 
the same. However, the way negative selection algorithms usually generate a 
blacklist is stochastic as a dynamically changing set of cells is used. Further- 
more, antigen are matched to the blacklist by random encounters between TCs 
and antigen, so there may be some errors. When implementing the negative 
selection classifier here, the aim is to reduce these errors as much as possible, 
otherwise they might influence true and false positive rates. The parameters 
are hence selected to create a high turnover of naive TCs, which allows them 
to inspect many semimature and mature DCs and the antigen they present. 
The tlr algorithm also performs much better than the DCA with regard to 
the false positive rate. In [10] the chief limitation of the DCA with the wuftpd 
dataset is cited as a requirement for much larger volumes of antigen data, 
which is connected with the stochastic nature of the DCA’s antigen sampling 
process. Also, the DCA is a much finer-grained system, classifying data on a 
per process basis. This means that, theoretically, the process responsible for 
the anomalous behaviour can be determined. However, the wuftpd dataset 
does not provide the names of the processes so there is no way in which this 
information can be utilized to the DCA’s advantage. 
 
 
 
7  CONCLUSIONS 
 
A novel host-based IDS (the tlr algorithm) has been presented in this paper. 
The architecture incorporates mechanisms inspired by both the innate and 
adaptive biological immune systems, in particular the interactions between 
two classes of immune cell, DCs and TCs. The performance of the system has 
been evaluated on a realistic process anomaly detection problem and compared 
to those of several other classifiers. It was found that the use of the innate 
immune system mechanisms employed in tlr contributed to a decrease in 
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the false positive rate and produced a better overall performance compared 
to policy-based methods, negative selection approaches, and an alternative 
DC-based AIS system (the DCA). The paper has also shown how runtime 
information such as memory and file usage levels can be used in combination 
with system call information to enhance detection capability. This suggests that 
such context signals might prove useful in improving the detection capabilities 
of other IDSs. Indeed, this work has employed novel context signals with a 
novel algorithm, so it could be the case that more well-established algorithms 
might perform as well as or better than tlr using these context signals. Further 
research is needed to implement and test such algorithms, although it is unclear 
how traditional approaches would combine the multiple data sources which 
is one of the hallmarks of this work. More sophisticated algorithms such as 
support vector machines or techniques from multisensor data fusion would 
seem more applicable in this sense. 
The generation of the wuftpd dataset showed that the collection and usage 
of runtime statistics as sources of external signals for second generation AISs 
is possible. Additionally, the use of publically-available datasets to generate 
the wuftpd dataset proved to be an effective methodology. Using part of the 
LBNL-FTP-PKT data, as well as data from other repositories, this technique 
could be employed to create a larger database of context signals, which would 
aid research into the use of these signals as input data for IDSs. 
In this work, failed attack sessions are classed as normal, but it may be 
argued that it is useful and necessary for failed attacks to be registered in order 
to alert an administrator of suspicious activity. Future work could therefore 
extend the IDS described here to include a third failed attack class rather than 
just the normal or abnormal data categories. 
Finally, the implementation of the tlr and the other second generation AISs 
more generally showed the feasibility of using libtissue to implement AISs 
as multiagent systems, and of applying them to real-world problems. 
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Parameter Name Value Description 
 
max_antigen 1000 maximum number of stored antigen 
max_cytokines 3 maximum number of stored signals 
max_cells 10000 maximum number of cells 
cell_update_rate (µsecs) 100000 rate at which cells are updated 
antigen_multiplier 10 number of copies of each antigen stored 
num_cells 1 100 number of immature DCs 
cell_lifespan 1 100 number of iterations an immature  DC 
lives for 
num_antigen 1 100  maximum number of antigen stored by 
an immature DC 
num_antigen_receptors 1 10  number of antigen an immature DC can 
store 
num_antigen_producers 1 100  number of antigen an immature DC can 
produce 
num_cytokine_receptors 1 3  number of signals an immature DC can 
respond to 
antigen_producer_action_time 10  number of iterations an immature DC 
presents antigen for 
num_cells 2 100  number of naive TCs 
cell_lifespan 2 10  number of iterations a naive TC lives for 
num_cell_receptors 2 1000  number of DCs a TC can bind with per 
iteration 
num_vr_receptors 2 100  number of antigen a TC can match per 
iteration 
cell_lifespan 3 100  number of iterations a semimature DC 
lives for 
cell_lifespan 4 100  number of iterations a mature DC lives 
for 
cell_lifespan 5 100  number of  iterations an  activated TC 
lives for 
probe_rate (µsecs) 1000000  rate at which cell population levels are 
sampled 
 
TABLE 4 
The  libtissue parameter  settings  used  for  tlr.  For  tlr1 and  tlr2 the 
max_cytokines and num_cytokine_receptors_1 parameters  are set to 1 and 
2 respectively 
 
 
A  LIBTISSUE PARAMETER SETTINGS 
 
The libtissue parameter values used for tlr are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
B  PLATFORM TECHNICAL DETAILS 
 
A Redhat 6.2 ISO image is downloaded from an official Redhat mirror and 
used to install a vanilla server as a VMware guest on the testbed.  The 
default wuftpd FTP server package (2.6.0-3) is replaced with a separately 
downloaded wuftpd 2.6.0-1 RPM. This is necessary as although the wuftpd 
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package in the original Redhat 6.2 distribution has the SITE EXEC vul- 
nerability, Redhat replaced this distribution with a “respin” (read “second 
edition”) which contains a patched wuftpd 2.6.0-3. Once installed, the default 
configuration of wuftpd is slightly modified to make it vulnerable. 
In the default installation, wuftpd is started at boot time wrapped by the 
inetd super-server. This makes monitoring more complex as in this configu- 
ration the FTP server is only started once a connection has been established 
through inetd. However, monitoring is technically easier when a process is 
running continuously. Therefore, the FTP server is disabled in inetd by com- 
menting out the appropriate FTP service entries in /etc/inetd.conf. An init 
script is written to start the FTP server as a standalone server, running con- 
tinuously, at boot time. In order to gather the actual data, i.e. process syscall 
information and context signals, the target system is instrumented: the FTP 
server executable is wrapped with strace [18], which logs all the syscalls 
made by wuftpd and its children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
